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ABSTRACT

This Comment will argue that Washington state courts must
promulgate a new, workable definition of “unfair-but-not-deceptive”
under Washington’s Consumer Protection Act. Washington courts have
acknowledged that a business act or practice can be unfair but not
deceptive, but a simple recognition does not fulfill the liberal intentions of
the Consumer Protection Act. By continuously declining to define unfairbut-not-deceptive, Washington courts have left consumers vulnerable and
without recourse. This Comment will highlight the approaches developed
by the federal government and other state governments on how to confront
the ambiguity of unfair-but-not-deceptive and will propose a concrete
definition for the term.
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INTRODUCTION
On Saturday, August 27, 2011, Neil Rush parked his car on a private
property easement, with permission, but his car was towed by Top Notch
Towing Company. In response, Neil filed an impound hearing request
form, and notice was served onto Top Notch and its owner, William
Blackburn. At the impound hearing in November, the district court found
that Neil’s car had been illegally towed and that Neil was entitled to
damages and to redeem his vehicle from Top Notch without the payment
of any costs. However, William Blackburn had sold Neil’s car to himself
at an auction for $1 in October and did not contact Neil, even though he
had Neil’s contact information. Neil then sued Top Notch and William
Blackburn for violation of his state’s local consumer protection law,
alleging that the sale of his car while the impound hearing was pending
was an unfair act. The judge granted summary judgment in favor of Top
Notch. The court held that Top Notch and William Blackburn’s actions
were not unfair under the law because (1) it was not a situation that was
likely to be repeated and (2) William Blackburn’s action of selling Neil’s
car to himself was not illegal. Consequently, Neil could not recover his
car, although another court said he was entitled to because it was not clear
how an act or practice is unfair in his state.1
Consumer protection enforcement on the state level has seen a rise
as of late, particularly in Washington. Since taking office in 2013,
Washington State Attorney General, Bob Ferguson, has focused the
Attorney General’s efforts on the Consumer Protection Division, doubling
the size of the division2 and returning more than $17 million to the state
and Washington consumers during the 2016 fiscal year alone.3 But despite
this increase in state enforcement, and Washington law’s broad prohibition
1. Facts based on Rush v. Blackburn, 361 P.3d 217 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
2. About Bob Ferguson, BOB FERGUSON: ATT’Y GEN., https://www.electbobferguson.com/
about/ [https://perma.cc/PR2K-77DU].
3. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2017), https://agportals3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploadedfiles/2016%20AR%20Print.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU6UUBSB].
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of “unfair and deceptive acts, and violations of many other consumer
protection laws . . . ,”4 Washington courts have avoided deciding how an
act or practice can be unfair but not deceptive. Many other states and the
federal government have addressed this ambiguity through court
decisions. It is imperative, now more than ever, that Washington courts
conduct statutory interpretation to address this hole in Washington’s
consumer protection law.
Part I of this Comment will address the federal consumer protection
regime and the need for local consumer protection laws. Part II will discuss
the current Washington Consumer Protection Act and the pitfalls of
leaving unfair-but-not-deceptive undefined. Part III will explore how
sister jurisdictions have confronted the unfair-but-not-deceptive
ambiguity. Part IV will argue that the Washington courts should
affirmatively act in promulgating a definition.
I. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND A NEED FOR LOCAL
CONSUMER PROTECTIONS
Federal consumer protection law is not uniform, and its coverage is
not comprehensive. For example, in response to increased telemarketing,
robocalls, and consumer harassment, Congress passed the Telemarketing
Consumer Protection Act of 19915 and the Telemarketing Consumer Fraud
and Abuse Prevention Act6 in 1994, with the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC or the Commission) promulgating its own telemarketing rules, called
the “Telemarketing Sales Rule,” in 1995.7 Robocalls still evaded federal
regulation, and, consequently, Congress created the Do Not Call Registry
in 2003.8 But Federal Communications Commission (FCC) data as of
February 2019 shows that there were over 232,000 consumer complaints
just on robocalls to the FCC in 2018 alone.9 Despite Congress’s best

4. CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A
50-STATE EVALUATION OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES LAWS 64 (2018),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P46W-TT2X] (analyzing
the strengths and weaknesses of the laws in each state and the District of Columbia that prohibit
deceptive and unfair practices in consumer transactions). See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (1961).
5. 47 U.S.C. § 227.
6. Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101–6108 (2006).
7. 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.1–310.9 (2010).
8. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6151–6155 (2003). See generally Maria G.
Hibbard, Hanging Up Too Early: Remedies to Reduce Robocalls, 5 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. &
INTERNET 79, 85–96 (2014) (describing the statutory and regulatory structure that addresses
robocalling and the detrimental effect of inconsistent regulation).
9. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, REPORT ON ROBOCALLS CG DOCKET NO. 17-59, at 4 (2019)
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-356196A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UZB-NRD6].
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efforts in the early 2000s,10 no uniform federal framework exists for
consumer protection and its enforcement. Each federal law deals with a
discrete area, usually in a unique way. The Consumer Credit Protection
Act (CCPA), for instance, requires that credit terms be disclosed to
borrowers and that lenders not discriminate when granting credit.11 The
CCPA also governs consumer leases,12 debt collection,13 and electronic
fund transfers,14 among other consumer issues. Whether consumers are
protected depends largely on the type of institution with whom the
consumer is doing business. Commentators have noted, for example,
The federal law regulating debt collectors applies only to third party
collectors. While a national bank is subject to many federal
regulations, check cashing operations and the Internet lender PayPal
are subject to state money transmitter laws that provide far less
consumer protection. A national bank is subject to regulations issued
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), while a state
chartered bank is subject to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) regulations.15

A chaotic uncertainty exists in consumer protection laws at the
federal level, as evidenced by the area of consumer lending. Each federal
statute regulates a specific industry, resulting in ambiguity as to when a
consumer’s rights have been violated.
The FTC is the sole enforcement body for federal consumer
protection. The FTC has the greatest discretion to provide guidance on the
FTC Act provisions that prohibit unfair and deceptive acts or practices but
has not vigorously enforced these federal statutes. For example, in the
1970s, the FTC sought to resolve consumer problems by issuing
regulations that applied to an entire sector, covering a wide breadth of
practices.16 However, during the Reagan administration, the FTC began to
review unfair and deceptive practices solely on a case-by-case basis;17 the
change resulted in the FTC review only affecting the target company,
rather than an entire industry. While it may appear that other companies
within the same industry as the target company would be on notice that
10. See Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer Protection
Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 666–
68 (2008).
11. Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)–(c) (2010).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667–1667(f) (2010).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692(o) (2010).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693(r) (2010).
15. Budnitz, supra note 10, at 670 (footnotes omitted).
16. Id. at 670–71. Examples of these 1970s-era rules include the following: The Door-to-Door
Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2020); Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (2020); Holder-InDue-Course Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2020).
17. Budnitz, supra note 10, at 671.

2020]

Unfair-But-Not-Deceptive

1015

similar actions may be subject to FTC enforcement action, Mark Budnitz
has argued that the FTC often does not act against other companies in the
same sector for a number of reasons:18
[The FTC] may not be aware of other companies that are engaging in
that conduct. Even if it is aware, it may not have the resources to
act. . . . Other abusive practices may take priority, requiring the FTC
to direct its efforts elsewhere. Finally, a company may structure its
act or practice in a way that is somewhat different from that of the
business against which the FTC acted, giving the company the
argument that its conduct should be distinguished from that which the
FTC found illegal. The FTC may choose to act instead against
companies where such distinctions cannot be made because they are
easier to win.19

The FTC’s sporadic enforcement of federal laws to single actors
minimizes consumer rights, rather than expanding protections.
Moreover, the actual consumers who are harmed by unfair and
deceptive practices have no private right of action under the FTC Act.20
Injured consumers may submit a consumer complaint to the FTC, but the
FTC itself cannot resolve individual complaints.21 Returning to Neil, our
injured consumer whose car was towed by Top Notch; Under a federal
regime, Neil could not sue Top Notch for a violation of consumer
protection law because the FTC has exclusive enforcement. Neil could
only file a complaint to the FTC about the unfair practice, but any
proceeding brought by the FTC would not settle Neil’s individual issues
with Top Notch. Thus, in terms of federal consumer protection, consumers
are underrepresented and powerless. They may file complaints with the
FTC but cannot bring an action under federal law. As such, injured
consumers must turn to their states’ consumer protection laws to resolve
their injuries. A separate state consumer protection regime allows for
consumers to be proactive in protecting their rights, rather than waiting for
the FTC to potentially act against one offender.
Consumers can fully exercise their political powers by passing local
statutes that address their specific grievances. The doctrine of federalism
is necessary to give the consumer political power to redress the limitations
of the chaotic federal consumer protection laws. Washington has thusly
responded to the federal chaos.

18. Id.
19. Id. at 671 n.39 (citation omitted).
20. Id. at 675.
21. FTC Complaint Assistant, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov/#
crnt&panel1-1 [https://perma.cc/AJG8-KXMW].
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II. THE WASHINGTON CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
In 1961, the Washington State Legislature passed RCW 19.86.020,
commonly known as the Consumer Protection Act (CPA or the Act).22 The
Act declares: “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are
hereby . . . unlawful.”23 The CPA states that the Legislature’s intent and
purpose was “to protect the public and foster fair and honest competition,”
mandating that the CPA “be liberally construed [so] that its beneficial
purposes may be served.”24 The Washington Supreme Court has liberally
construed the CPA in the past to fulfill the Act’s legislative purpose,
holding that there can be per se violations of the CPA.25 A per se violation
allows for plaintiffs to show unfair methods of competition or unfair or
deceptive acts or practices through alleging the violation of another
statute.26 There are two types of statutory declarations that might constitute
a per se violation of the CPA: (1) when a statute has been declared by the
Legislature to constitute an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce
or an unfair trade practice and (2) when a statute has a separate public
interest declaration.27 Statutes with both an “unfair or deceptive act in trade
or commerce” declaration and a “public interest” declaration include
statutes on personal wireless numbers,28 adoption advertising,29 credit
reporting,30 consumer leases of motor vehicles,31 discrimination and civil
rights,32 advertising prizes and promotions,33 and commercial telephone
solicitation.34 Statutes with only an “unfair or deceptive act or practice”
declaration include laws on bail bond agents,35 business opportunity
fraud,36 pyramid schemes,37 collection agencies,38 credit service
22. 1961 Wash. Sess. Laws 1956–64; see also Jonathan A. Mark, Dispensing with the Public
Interest Requirement in Private Causes of Action Under the Washington Consumer Protection Act, 29
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 205, 207–14 (2005) (providing a more detailed history of the early years of
the CPA).
23. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (1961).
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (1985).
25. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 535–36 (Wash.
1986).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.250.040 (2008).
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.400(3) (2006).
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.150 (1993).
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 63.10.050 (1995).
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030(3) (2009).
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.170.010 (1991).
34. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.158.010 (1989), 19.158.030 (1989).
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.185.210 (1993).
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.110.170 (1981).
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.275.040 (2006).
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16.440 (1994).
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agencies,39 and franchises.40 The Washington Courts have played an active
role in realizing the purpose of the CPA and expanding consumer rights in
Washington, and should continue.
Under the original iteration of the CPA, the State Attorney General
possessed sole enforcement power. The State Legislature amended the
CPA in 1970 to allow for a private right of action, in response to the need
for additional enforcement capabilities.41 The burdens on the State as a
plaintiff versus a private citizen are notable. To succeed on a CPA claim,
the State must prove (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2)
occurring in trade or commerce; and (3) that has a public interest impact.42
Conversely, a private plaintiff must show five distinct elements: (1) an
unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3)
which has a public interest impact; (4) an injury to the plaintiff’s business
or property; and (5) causation.43 Common to both types of plaintiffs is the
essential requirement for a CPA claim: an unfair or deceptive act. Because
the CPA does not define unfair or deceptive, the onus is on the courts to
define these critical words “through a gradual process of judicial inclusion
and exclusion.”44 The meaning of deceptive has been well litigated.45
Deception exists if a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to
mislead a reasonable consumer occurs.46 Washington courts have noted,
however, that the “or” between unfair and deceptive is disjunctive and that
“an act or practice can be unfair without being deceptive.”47
But what does it mean for an act to be unfair without being
deceptive? When pressed on this issue, Washington courts have largely
deferred to federal interpretation and have not created any meaningful
jurisprudence that allows for either the State or an individual plaintiff to
concretely know what is required to succeed on an unfair-but-notdeceptive CPA claim. The Washington Court of Appeals has provided
some guidance on what constitutes unfairness under the CPA. For
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.134.070(5) (1986).
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.190 (2011).
41. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (2009). See generally Susan Clyatt Lybeck, Recent
Developments, New Consumer Protection Private Action Test: Clarification or Further Confusion?—
Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Insurance Co., 105 Wn.2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986),
62 WASH. L. REV. 277 (1987) (for a contemporaneous response to the 1970 amendment allowing for
a CPA private right of action).
42. State v. Kaiser, 254 P.3d 850, 858 (Wash Ct. App. 2011).
43. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 533
(Wash. 1986).
44. Saunders v. Lloyd’s of London, 779 P.2d 249, 256–57 (Wash. 1989).
45. See Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 204 P.3d 885, 885 (Wash. 2008); Hangman Ridge
Training Stables, Inc., 719 P.2d at 535; Behnke v. Ahrens, 294 P.3d 729, 734–76 (Wash. Ct. App.
2012).
46. State v. Mandatory Poster Agency, Inc., 398 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
47. Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 295 P.3d 1179, 1187 (Wash. 2013).
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example, the court held in Magney v. Lincoln Mutual Savings Bank that
an act can be unfair under the CPA if it offends public policy in a general
sense, is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or causes
substantial injury to consumers, competition, or other businesses, relying
on a United States Supreme Court ruling.48 But, another case in the
Washington Court of Appeals held that unfair is an act or practice that is
“not regulated by statute but in violation of public interest.”49 And the
Washington Supreme Court noted in dicta that an act can be unfair without
being deceptive, relying on a different federal law, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n),
which states a practice is unfair if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits.”50 While in
Klem the Washington Supreme Court noted that the federal law could have
an impact on the meaning of the CPA, the Court also said that what that
means “must wait for another day.”51
That day has come. The uncertainty in what makes an act unfair and
deference to federal interpretations can no longer stand. If the CPA is to
fulfill its purpose to protect the public and foster fair and honest
competition, amidst the growing rise of blue state federalism, Washington
courts should create its own jurisprudence and not rely on a federal
interpretation of unfair but not deceptive.
The case of State v. Arlene’s Flowers illustrates the dilemma.
Washington sued Arlene’s Flowers, a florist located in Richland, who
refused to provide services for a same-sex wedding in 2013.52 The owner
of Arlene’s Flowers rejected the Attorney General’s request to comply
with Washington law prohibiting businesses from discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation.53 Subsequently, the State filed suit claiming a
per se CPA violation under Washington’s Law Against Discrimination
(WLAD) and a CPA violation for an unfair practice in trade or
commerce.54 The trial court found that Arlene’s Flowers violated the CPA
as an unfair or deceptive act, even if the florist had not committed a per se
violation of the Act.55 In a unanimous decision, the Washington Supreme
48. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972); Magney v. Lincoln Mut. Sav.
Bank, 659 P.2d 537, 545 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
49. Folweiler Chiropractic, PS v. Am. Fam. Ins. Co., 429 P.3d 813, 818 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018)
(quoting Klem, 295 P.3d at 1187) (internal quotations omitted).
50. Klem, 295 P.3d at 1187.
51. Id.
52. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief Under the Consumer Protection Act, State v.
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (No. 13-2-00871-5), 2013 WL 10257916
[hereinafter Arlene’s Flowers State Complaint].
53. AG ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3.
54. Arlene’s Flowers State Complaint, supra note 52.
55. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 567 n.23 (Wash. 2017).
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Court upheld the trial court’s decision, holding that Arlene’s Flowers
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation56 and that the owner’s sale
of floral arrangements was not expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment.57
While the trial court’s finding of the unfair CPA violation was not an
issue on appeal,58 the United States Supreme Court vacated the
Washington Supreme Court ruling and remanded for further consideration
in light of its decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission.59 Masterpiece Cakeshop is a strikingly similar case in which
a Colorado baker refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.60
The United States Supreme Court declared that the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, acting pursuant to the Colorado Anti–Discrimination Act,
violated the Free Exercise Clause and that religious and philosophical
objections to gay marriage are protected views and may be forms of
expression.61
Arlene’s Flowers’ act of denying flowers to a same-sex couple was
an unfair-but-not-deceptive act. The Washington Supreme Court on
remand, and in reviewing Arlene’s Flowers in light of Masterpiece
Cakeshop, did not hold that Arlene’s Flowers’ objections to gay marriage
are protected views.62 But again, Arlene’s Flowers has filed a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court to review the Washington
Supreme Court’s decision from the perspective of Masterpiece
Cakeshop.63 While Justice Anthony Kennedy—the author of the majority
opinion in Masterpiece—has retired, it is entirely possible for the
increasingly conservative Supreme Court to side with Arlene’s Flowers.64
56. Id. at 552.
57. Id. at 556–60. The owner of Arlene’s Flowers argued that her floral arrangements are artistic
expressions protected by both the state and federal constitutions and that the state discrimination law
impermissibly compelled her to speak in favor of same-sex marriage. Id. at 556. The Court found that
the owner did not carry her burden to prove her floral arrangements constituted speech. Id.
58. Id. at 567 n.23.
59. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (mem.).
60. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018).
61. Id. at 1731–32.
62. See State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019) (finding that WLAD was
neutrally applied to the owner of Arlene’s Flowers and that the application of WLAD neither violated
her First Amendment protections against compelled speech nor violated her right to religious free
exercise).
63. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018)
(mem.) (No. 17-108), 2017 WL 3126218.
64. Following the retirement of Justice Kennedy, President Trump appointed another
conservative justice to the Court—Brett Kavanaugh. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh Is Sworn in
After Close Confirmation Vote in Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/10/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/3B7F-SATM]. Justice
Kavanaugh is a well-respected member of the Federalist Society, an influential conservative legal
group, and has spoken at Federalist Society events, even after his confirmation to the Supreme Court.
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If that is the case, the state’s attorney general would not succeed on its per
se CPA violation claim through WLAD; but it is unclear whether this
would impact the consumers, a same-sex couple who have been together
since 2004 and who simply wanted to purchase flowers for their
wedding,65 and their private right of action.
What is clear is that, in Arlene’s Flowers, both the State and the
private consumers66 alleged a CPA violation of an unfair-but-notdeceptive practice.67 And no reliable jurisprudence exists for the State or
consumers to utilize. If Washington is to fulfill the promise and purpose
of the CPA, the court must define when an act is unfair-but-not-deceptive.
III. SISTER JURISDICTIONS CONFRONT THE AMBIGUITY
A. Federal: Unfair Consumer Injury
Relying on FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., the Washington
Court of Appeals held in Magney that an act can be unfair under the CPA
if it (1) offends public policy in a general sense, (2) is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous, or (3) causes substantial injury to consumers,
competition, or other businesses.68 In FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co.,
the United States Supreme Court adopted the three factor test that the FTC
considers in determining whether a practice is unfair.69 The Sperry three
factor test is specific to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTC Act) that prohibits, in part, “unfair . . . acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.”70 The federal statute also notes, however, that public
policy “may not serve as a primary basis” for a determination of
See Adam Liptak, Kavanaugh Recalls His Confirmation at Conservative Legal Group’s Annual Gala,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/14/us/kavanaugh-federalistsociety.html [https://perma.cc/6WFJ-7RYS]. Justice Kavanaugh’s addition to the Supreme Court has
only contributed to the growing conservative trend of the Roberts Court. See Amelia ThomsonDeVeaux, Is the Supreme Court Heading for a Conservative Revolution?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 7,
2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/is-the-supreme-court-heading-for-a-conservativerevolution [https://perma.cc/Z9PK-6ZXN]. It is therefore very likely, in the author’s opinion, that the
current makeup of the Supreme Court would side with the florist in this case and extend Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s ruling.
65. ACLU, Ingersoll v. Arlene’s Flowers–Complaint, https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/
ingersoll-v-arlenes-flowers-complaint [https://perma.cc/QH65-G9DV] [hereinafter Arlene’s Flowers
Ingersoll Complaint].
66. The couple, Robert Ingersoll and Curtis Freed, filed a private lawsuit against Arlene’s
Flowers, which the trial court consolidated with the State’s case. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389
P.3d 543, 550 (Wash. 2017).
67. Arlene’s Flowers State Complaint, supra note 52; Arlene’s Flowers Ingersoll Complaint,
supra 65, at 5.
68. Magney v. Lincoln Mut. Sav. Bank, 659 P.2d 537, 545 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
69. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) [hereinafter Sperry test].
70. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
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unfairness.71 In addition, federal courts have relied on a Commission
policy statement promulgated in 198072 that contained an abstract
definition of “unfairness.”73 The Commission’s policy statement asserts
that unjustified substantial consumer injury is the primary focus of the
FTC Act and is the most important of the three Sperry factors.74
Accordingly, Congress has since enacted 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).75 The
statute states that an act or practice that causes consumer injury is unfair
when the injury satisfies three elements: (1) the injury must be substantial;
(2) the injury must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to
consumers or competition that the practice produces; and (3) it must be an
injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.76 In
addition to these elements, it also appears that federal courts are
interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) to include an element of causation.77
1. Substantial Injury
First, a federal court has held that the FTC can satisfy substantiality
by establishing consumers “were injured by a practice for which they did
not bargain.”78 An act or practice can also create a substantial injury by
doing a small harm to a large class of people or if it raises a significant risk
of concrete harm.79 These type of injuries generally refer to consumer
injuries that were monetary in nature and affected a wide range of
individuals. But federal and FTC administrative court decisions have also
found substantial consumer injury where the injury was physical, concrete
harm or risk of such harm.80
71. Id. at § 45(n).
72. Letter from Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, FTC to Hon. Wendell H. Ford, Chairman, Senate
Consumer Subcomm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., and Hon. John C. Danforth, Ranking Minority
Leader, Senate Consumer Subcomm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp. (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in Int’l
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 app. at 1070–76, 1071 (1984) [hereinafter F.T.C. Unfairness Policy
Statement], https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness [https://
perma.cc/E6B3-PT46].
73. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 1998); see also FTC v.
Windward Mktg., Inc., No. Civ.A 1:96–CV–615F, 1997 WL 33642380, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30,
1997).
74. F.T.C. Unfairness Policy Statement, supra note 72.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006).
76. Id.
77. See infra Part III.a.iv.
78. FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010).
79. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
80. See Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984) (explaining that consumers were injured by a
defect in defendant’s tractors, which caused hot fuel to shoot or geyser up to twenty feet); Philip
Morris, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 16 (1973) (stating consumers were at a risk of harm because razor blades were
distributed for a promotion without any warning labels). Cf. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931)
(showing that prior to the Section 5 amendments discussed above, the Supreme Court rejected the
FTC’s assertion that a diet pill manufacturer violated Section 5 because the agency failed to
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In International Harvester, the FTC found through the defendant
company’s documents that out of roughly 1.3 million tractors sold,
“twelve are known to have been involved in geysering accidents involving
bodily injury. This is an accident rate of less than .001 percent, over a
period of more than 40 years.”81 The FTC therefore knew the specific
individuals who had been physically injured by the unfair practice and had
even taken their depositions.82 Thus, it appears that when the unfair
practice causes a physical consumer injury, it helps prove the injury when
the FTC has identified actual injured consumers. In contrast, the FTC
administrative court in Philip Morris held that the risk of physical injury
to small children, because of a corporation’s actions in distributing razor
blades for a promotion, amounted to an unfair act or practice.83 The mere
risk of injury because of an unsafe marketing technique was sufficient for
the administrative court to hold that Philip Morris had engaged in an unfair
act. Philip Morris, and even International Harvester, represent exceptions
to the norm, as most of the FTC’s actions under 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) involve
a substantial, monetary injury.
2. Balancing
Second, the federal statute also prohibits finding a practice to be
unfair if the allegedly unfair act is outweighed by countervailing benefits
to consumers or to competition.84 In probing the limits of balancing, FTC
v. Windward Marketing Inc. held that when a practice produces clear
adverse consequences for consumers that are not accompanied by an
increase in services or benefits to consumers or benefits to competition,
then the unfairness of the practice is not outweighed.85
3. Consumer Avoidance
Finally, consumers must act to avoid injury before it occurs if they
“have reason to anticipate the impending harm and the means to avoid it,
or if consumers were aware of, and are reasonably capable of pursuing,
potential avenues toward mitigating the injury after the fact.”86 When
determining if consumers reasonably could have avoided any injury, the

demonstrate harm to competition; however, the Court found that the FTC did present evidence that
the practices could be harmful to the consumers).
81. Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. at 1063.
82. Id. at 1017.
83. Philip Morris, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 16 (1973).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006).
85. FTC v. Windward Mktg., Inc., No. Civ.A 1:96–CV–615F, 1997 WL 33642380, at *11 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 30, 1997).
86. Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2012).
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federal circuit focuses on “whether the consumers had a free and informed
choice that would have enabled them to avoid the unfair practice.”87
4. Causation?
Federal courts have also recently held that a causation element must
be shown by the FTC in proving an unfair consumer injury claim. In FTC
v. Neovi, Inc., the Ninth Circuit analyzed, on an appeal from a summary
judgment grant for the FTC, specifically whether the FTC had met the
causation requirement.88 The complaint merely pled that the defendants’
“actions have resulted in financial losses to victims,” and then proceeded
to list out the consumer’s injuries.89 In the District of New Jersey, ruling
on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the “FTC’s
allegations also permit the Court to reasonably infer that [the Defendant’s]
data-security practices caused theft of personal data, which ultimately
caused substantial injury to consumers.”90 It, therefore, appears that the
federal courts allow for basic level causation to satisfy the consumer injury
unfairness test, but causation must nonetheless be alleged.
When all three, potentially four, elements are met for an unfairness
claim, the unfairness cases brought by the FTC generally fall into one of
four categories: (1) use of coercion or high pressure selling; (2)
withholding material information; (3) making claims without
substantiation; or (4) post-purchase rights and remedies.91 The
Commission may exercise its unfairness jurisdiction over practices that do
not fit into one of the listed categories, but the FTC is still limited to only
pursuing unfair acts or practices that cause consumer injury.92
B. Illinois: Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
Illinois’s version of the CPA is the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) and is intended to protect
consumers, borrowers, and business persons against fraud, unfair methods
of competition, and other unfair and deceptive business practices.93 Like
the Washington CPA, the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act is to be liberally

87. Windward Mktg., 1997 WL 33642380, at *11. See also FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150,
1158 (9th Cir. 2010).
88. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d at 1155.
89. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 4, FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150
(9th Cir. 2010) (No. 06-CV-1952-R-JMA).
90. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 624 (D. N.J. 2014).
91. PETER C. WARD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5.04
(2018).
92. Id.
93. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2 (1992).
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construed to effectuate its purpose.94 The Consumer Fraud Act differs
from the CPA, however, in the elements required to bring a successful
claim. Illinois requires (1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant; (2)
that the defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely on the deception; and
(3) that the deception occurred during a course of conduct involving trade
or commerce.95
Illinois courts have similarly held that a business practice can be
unfair-but-not-deceptive and have stated that whether a practice is unfair
must be determined on a case-by-case basis.96 The Consumer Fraud Act
actually mandates that “consideration shall be given to the interpretations
of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to Section
5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act”97 when an Illinois court
determines whether an act is unfair under the Consumer Fraud Act. Similar
to the Washington Courts, the Illinois Courts have acknowledged the
FTC’s three factor test promulgated in Sperry and Hutchinson; however,
the Illinois Courts––unlike the Washington Courts––have actually applied
the test in order to construe the Consumer Fraud Act to effectuate its
purpose liberally.
For example, in Saunders v. Michigan Avenue National Bank, the
plaintiff brought suit under the Consumer Fraud Act alleging that the Bank
engaged in an unfair practice, and, on appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals
reviewed her claim using the Sperry test.98 The court, in this case, failed
to find that the Bank’s overdraft fee practice violated the Sperry test; the
court held that for the defendant’s conduct to be unfair, the conduct must
violate public policy, be so oppressive as to leave the consumer with little
alternative except to submit to it, and injure the consumer.99 This holding
suggests that all three factors of the Sperry test must be met to establish an
unfair-but-not-deceptive claim in Illinois. In Jones v. Universal Casualty
Co., the Illinois court rejected an unfair-but-not-deceptive claim
subsequent to initially adopting the Sperry test that failed to plead all three
factors.100
In response, the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly held that a plaintiff
does not bear the burden of establishing all three factors.101 The Illinois
Supreme Court turned to the Connecticut Supreme Court to support its
94. Cripe v. Leiter, 703 N.E.2d 100, 191 (Ill. 1998).
95. Id.
96. See Scott v. Ass’n for Childbirth at Home, Int’l, 430 N.E.2d 1012, 1018 (Ill. 1981); Elder v.
Coronet Ins. Co., 558 N.E.2d 1312, 1316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
97. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2 (1992).
98. Saunders v. Mich. Ave. Nat’l Bank, 662 N.E.2d 602, 608 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
99. Id. (citing FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 250 n.5 (1972)).
100. See Jones v. Universal Cas. Co., 630 N.E.2d 94, 103 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
101. Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 961 (Ill. 2002).
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ruling, evidencing that other state courts turn to sister jurisdictions in
confronting the unfair-but-not-deceptive ambiguity.102 The Illinois
Supreme Court adopted the Connecticut ruling from Cheshire as its own:
“All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of
unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it
meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three.”103
1. Immoral, Unethical, Oppressive, or Unscrupulous
Under the Consumer Fraud Act, a practice is considered immoral,
unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous “if it imposes a lack of meaningful
choice or an unreasonable burden on the consumer.”104 In one such case,
a plaintiff brought suit under the Consumer Fraud Act alleging an unfair
practice when his car was wrongfully repossessed.105 In Demitro v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., an employee of General Motors
discovered that the plaintiff’s car had been wrongfully repossessed; rather
than returning the vehicle to the plaintiff and allowing the plaintiff to bring
his account current by paying a little over $2,000, the employee decided
to keep the vehicle until the plaintiff could pay off the outstanding balance
of $39,695.04.106 While the court found this act caused substantial injury
to the plaintiff by damaging his credit rating, it ultimately held that the
defendant engaged in an unfair business practice because its act was
oppressive.107 The defendant left the plaintiff with only two options: pay
the entire outstanding balance of nearly $40,000 or lose his vehicle.108
When Illinois courts find oppressive conduct in an unfair-but-notdeceptive claim, it appears they also find substantial consumer injury.109
Illinois courts often, if not exclusively, require a financial injury when
finding that an act was oppressive.

102. Id. (citing Cheshire Mortg. Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130, 1143 (Conn. 1992)).
103. Cheshire, 612 A.2d at 1143–44.
104. Stonecrafters, Inc. v. Foxfire Printing and Packaging, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d. 610, 614 (N.D.
Ill. 2009) (quoting W. Ry. Devices Corp. v. Lusida Rubber Prods., Inc., No. 06 C 0052, 2006 WL
1697119, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2006)); see also Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 962; W. Ry. Devices Corp.,
2006 WL 1697119, at *6.
105. Demitro v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 902 N.E.2d 1163, 1168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1168–69.
109. See id.; Dubey v. Pub. Storage, Inc., 918 N.E.2d 265, 278 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that
the defendant’s conduct was oppressive where the plaintiff was never served with a notice of lien or
notice as to the auction sale of her property and that, as a result, the plaintiff suffered substantial injury
by the permanent loss of property).
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2. Public Policy
Claiming unfair-but-not-deceptive under the public policy Sperry
factor can present a more challenging claim for plaintiffs. In Illinois, a
practice can offend public policy if it violates an existing statute or
common law doctrine that typically applies to such a situation.110 In
allowing a public policy violation to prove an unfair-but-not-deceptive
claim through a violation of an existing statute, Illinois has effectively
allowed plaintiffs to predicate their Consumer Fraud Act claims on other
statutes or regulations that do not allow for private enforcement.111 This
definition of a public policy violation allows individual consumers to
challenge unfair business practices when the government has failed to
regulate or bring its own action against the perpetrator. In essence, Illinois
has acknowledged that a regulatory violation, even if the violation itself is
not a per se violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, offends public policy
and is an unfair-but-not-deceptive practice. But this means that a plaintiff
must also prove the elements of the additional statutory or regulatory
violation in addition to the elements required to prove a Consumer Fraud
Act claim.
If a plaintiff fails to identify a violation of a particular statute that
contains a standard of conduct, he or she can still allege a violation of a
common law doctrine that typically applies in the situation. For instance,
in Boyd v. U.S. Bank, a plaintiff alleged an unfair-but-not-deceptive
Consumer Fraud Act violation under two statutory violations and a
violation of the defendants’ common law duty of good faith and fair
dealing.112 While the defendants moved to dismiss the unfair practice
claim under the public policy statute prong, the defendants did not seek to
dismiss the unfair-but-not-deceptive claim under the theory of common
law violation.113 Illinois courts have thus strengthened consumer
protection by incorporating common law violations as wrongs.
Both the statutory and common law definitions of public policy for
an unfair-but-not-deceptive claim expand the Consumer Fraud Act to
110. See Ekl v. Knecht, 585 N.E.2d 156, 163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that the defendant’s
conduct was offensive to public policy because it implicates the common law doctrine that contracts
which are the product of duress will be voided); Elder v. Coronet Ins. Co., 558 N.E.2d 1312, 1314,
1316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding that an insurer requiring a claimant take a polygraph test to “speed
up investigation and settlement of [his] claim” violated public policy because of an Illinois statutory
prohibition against requiring a party to submit to a polygraph test in a civil trial or a pre-trial
proceeding).
111. See Gainer Bank, N.A. v. Jenkins, 672 N.E.2d 317, 318–19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding
that a plaintiff may predicate a Consumer Fraud Act claim on the Illinois Motor Vehicle Retail
Installment Sales Act, though this act does not create a private right of action).
112. Boyd v. U.S. Bank, N.A., ex rel. Sasco Aames Mortg. Loan Tr., Series 2003-1, 787 F. Supp.
2d 747, 752 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
113. Id.
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reach most aspects of a business’s duties—duties it holds not just to
consumers—within Illinois. While the public policy Sperry factor seems
to be a catch-all for the Consumer Fraud Act, what happens when an
unfair-but-not-deceptive public policy claim cannot meet the requirements
of a statutory or common law violation? A federal court in the Northern
District of Illinois, when reviewing a Consumer Fraud Act claim,
suggested that when such a situation occurs, “the determination of public
policy is primarily a legislative function.”114
In sum, a consumer in Illinois can bring an unfair-but-not-deceptive
claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. The Illinois courts have liberally
construed the Consumer Fraud Act to include unfair-but-not-deceptive
claims and have also adopted the Sperry factor test. When applying the
Sperry test in Illinois, a consumer does not need to prove all three factors,
thus increasing the likelihood the consumer will succeed on his or her
claim, and the liberal purpose of the Consumer Fraud Act will be fulfilled.
IV. WASHINGTON’S SOLUTION
If the CPA is to fulfill the intentions of Washington’s legislature,115
Washington courts must define unfair-but-not-deceptive. By simply
holding that an act or practice can be unfair-but-not-deceptive but not
providing a definition, the Washington courts ignore the CPA’s purpose
and leave consumers vulnerable when they should be protected. I call upon
the courts to define unfair-but-not-deceptive and fill this hole to protect
Washington’s consumers.
Legislators foresaw that gaps in the CPA would exist and dictated
that “the courts be guided by final decisions of the federal courts and final
orders of the federal trade commission interpreting the various federal
statutes dealing with the same or similar matters” when making
unprecedented decisions.116 Washington courts have acknowledged the
Sperry test,117 as well as the consumer injury statute,118 in connection to
the CPA mandate. But when we look to the application of federal law, the
federal definition of unfair-but-not-deceptive falls short of the protections
needed in Washington. While the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged the three factors that make an act or practice unfair in

114. City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1075 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
(quoting Coleman v. E. Joliet Fire Prot. Dist., 46 N.E.3d 741, 757 (Ill. 2016)) (internal citations
omitted).
115. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (2020).
116. Id.
117. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972); Magney v. Lincoln Mut.
Sav. Bank, 659 P.2d 537, 545 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
118. See Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 295 P.3d 1179, 1187 (Wash. 2013).
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Sperry,119 the FTC has almost exclusively pursued unfair-but-notdeceptive acts or practices involving unjustified substantial consumer
injury, pursuant to the FTC’s 1980 policy statement.120 If Washington
courts were to look to the FTC solely for guidance to define unfair-butnot-deceptive, the federal definition would fall short in protecting
Washington consumers.
First, not all unfair practices involve consumer injury. Consumer
injuries, as pursued by the FTC, are usually monetary or concrete physical
harm.121 The unfair-but-not-deceptive claim brought against Arlene’s
Flowers by the Washington State Attorney General did not involve such a
consumer injury; sexual orientation discrimination, on its face, is neither
an injury that is monetary nor physical.122 While the per se CPA violation
against Arlene’s Flowers did not fail on remand in light of the Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s ruling, the growing conservative trend of the United States
Supreme Court could remove WLAD per se CPA violations.123 Defining
unfair-but-not-deceptive only as a substantial consumer injury still inhibits
the Washington Attorney General from pursuing similar claims to protect
vulnerable consumers.
Second, defining unfair-but-not-deceptive as exclusively a
substantial consumer injury imports an element of causation to the CPA.124
While private plaintiffs must allege causation to succeed on a CPA
claim,125 the State does not.126 If Washington courts only use the federal
approach, they will have to import the causation element. It is at the State’s
advantage to only have to prove three elements for the CPA, and including
causation through defining unfair-but-not-deceptive as exclusively an act
or practice that causes substantial consumer injury would restrict the State
rather than expand consumer rights and protections. Importing the federal
definition of unfair-but-not-deceptive is not fatal to the CPA, but
exclusively defining unfair-but-not-deceptive in Washington as
exclusively an act or practice that causes substantial consumer injury does
not fulfill the intentions of the CPA.
Washington courts should follow federal guidance for the substantial
consumer injury factor of the Sperry test, but the courts should also allow
119. Sperry, 405 U.S. at 244.
120. F.T.C Unfairness Policy Statement, supra note 72.
121. See discussion supra Section III.A.1 and accompanying notes.
122. See Arlene’s Flowers State Complaint, supra note 52; Arlene’s Flowers Ingersoll
Complaint, supra 65.
123. See supra text accompanying note 64.
124. See FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1155–57 (9th Cir. 2010).
125. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash.
1986).
126. State v. Kaiser, 254 P.3d 850, 858 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
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the other two Sperry factors to serve as a basis for an unfair-but-notdeceptive CPA claim. Washington courts have recognized the Sperry
test,127 but have not held that the test can be disjunctive as other states, like
Illinois and Connecticut, have done.128 Illinois’s early unfair-but-notdeceptive jurisprudence serves as an example of how the Sperry test can
limit consumer protections when courts require that a plaintiff meet all
three factors of the test. Recognizing that the Sperry test follows federal
consumer protection guidelines and applying it in the disjunctive allows
state courts to expand beyond the limitations of the FTC Act and develop
readily needed consumer protections at the state level. Washington should
follow in the path of other state courts, like Illinois and Connecticut, to
recognize that an act or practice can be unfair-but-not-deceptive to the
degree that the act or practice meets one of the Sperry test factors.
The Washington courts should hold that oppressive conduct is
conduct that leaves consumers no other choice but to submit to the unfair
practice as it is defined in the Sperry opinion.129 Oppressive conduct that
can amount to an unfair-but-not-deceptive business practice does not have
to be monetary in nature since monetary injuries to plaintiffs can also fall
under the substantial injury prong of the Sperry test. Washington courts
need not follow Illinois unfair-but-not-deceptive jurisprudence exactly.
Illinois courts have found oppressive conduct under the Sperry test to
mean acts or practices that have monetary effects on consumers.130
Connecticut courts, on the other hand, see oppressive conduct to mean “[a]
trade practice that is undertaken to maximize the defendant’s profit at the
expense of the plaintiff’s rights[.]”131 Washington courts can then find that
conduct that does not have drastic monetary effects on consumers is
oppressive. When considering this prong of the Sperry test to find an
unfair-but-not-deceptive act or practice, a Washington court should ask
whether the consumer had any choice in agreeing to the
business’s conduct.
An act or practice that offends public policy, the final Sperry factor,
serves as a catch-all for unfair-but-not-deceptive claims in Illinois, and it
should in Washington. Following Illinois’s precedent for an unfair-butnot-deceptive public policy violation provides a private right to action for
127. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972); Magney v. Lincoln Mut. Sav.
Bank, 659 P.2d 537, 545 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
128. See Cheshire Mortg. Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130, 1143 (Conn. 1992); Robinson
v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 961 (Ill. 2002).
129. Sperry, 405 U.S. at 244 n.5.
130. See discussion supra Section III.B.1 and accompanying notes.
131. David L. Belt, The Standard for Determining “Unfair Acts or Practices” Under State
Unfair Trade Practices Acts, 80 CONN. B. J. 247, 287 (2006) (quoting Votto v. Am. Car Rental, Inc.,
871 A.2d 981, 985 (Conn. 2005)).
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statutes that do not have a private right to action.132 The public policy
definition allows individual consumers to hold businesses responsible for
violations of statutes and regulations when the state or federal government
fails to intervene. Some may argue that such a definition for an unfair-butnot-deceptive act or practice would disempower the State in its own
enforcement actions. I argue that defining public policy violations in such
a way enhances the regulations and statutes. Businesses must follow such
regulations and statutes or face enforcement from the State as well as from
harmed consumers. While defining public policy in this way would require
the State and private plaintiffs to establish the elements of the regulatory
or statutory violation, this requirement is no different than the
requirements of a per se CPA violation.133 Additionally, importing the
Washington legislature’s definitions of public policy allows consumers
and the legislature to provide additional definitions of unfair-but-notdeceptive public policy violations.
Washington courts must hold that any of the three Sperry factors can
serve as the basis of an unfair-but-not-deceptive CPA claim. Doing so will
both fulfill the legislative purpose of the CPA, which is to be liberally
construed, and expand consumer protection rights in Washington.
CONCLUSION
Washington State has a comprehensive consumer protection law and
a dedicated consumer advocate as State Attorney General. But the CPA as
it stands today is insufficient to protect consumers from acts or practices
that are unfair-but-not-deceptive. By continuously declining to define
unfair-but-not-deceptive, Washington courts have left consumers
vulnerable and without recourse. If a business practice is not deceptive by
being either a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead
a reasonable consumer,134 but causes consumer harm, that practice is still
harmful. For example, the consumer harmed in Arlene’s Flowers was not
misled, but was denied services because of his sexual orientation: a
patently unfair act.135 If the U.S. Supreme Court grants the petition for writ
of certiorari, and the per se violation of the CPA fails, such a consumer is
left vulnerable to such abhorrent business practices because Washington
courts have failed to define unfair-but-not-deceptive.
Washington’s sister jurisdictions demonstrate that it is possible to
confront the ambiguity of unfair-but-not-deceptive. Washington courts
132. See generally Ekl v. Knecht, 585 N.E.2d 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Elder v. Coronet Ins. Co.,
558 N.E.2d 1312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 25–40.
134. State v. Mandatory Poster Agency, Inc., 398 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
135. Arlene’s Flowers State Complaint, supra note 52.
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should actively promulgate the CPA’s definition of unfair-but-notdeceptive. Washington courts must acknowledge that consumers are
harmed without being deceived, and individuals will be empowered and
stand against business practices that are unfair but not deceptive. Anything
less fails to effectuate the law’s protective purpose.

